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MODERN STRATEGY AND CONTRACT ISSUES BETWEEN FIRMS IN LICENSING OF
TECHNOLOGY
Andres C. Salazar, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA
ABSTRACT
Licensing of technology is commonly seen as a method of generating revenue for the licensor
(source) company’s assets in intellectual property and reciprocally a method of going to market
faster by the licensee (target) company using proven technology. Although technology licensing
has been studied in the past as simply a business activity between two firms involving
negotiations based on market opportunity and transactional costs, several modern factors have
emerged recently that would influence both the tone and nature of negotiations in the future.
Among these factors are the shortened lifespan of licensable technology, the internet as both an
information source and a sales distribution channel, the enormous growth of technology markets
in Asia and finally, the low level, if not the total absence, of protection for intellectual property in
significant global markets. This paper examines the effect of these factors on a firm’s technology
management strategies and the terms of licensing contracts between firms. It is proposed that it
is the long term strategy of technology management for both source and target firms that will
dictate the nature of future technology licensing contracts.
Keywords: Technology Licensing, Technology Contracts, Technology Management,
Technology Transfer.
1. MODERN FACTORS IN THE LICENSING OF TECHNOLOGY
This paper confines itself to reviewing modern issues in technology licensing faced by US
companies for three reasons: (a) US companies remain in aggregate a prodigious generator of
technological innovations; (b) the US also houses the largest market for technology based
products; and (c) the US has a generally consistent regional and national legal infrastructure
relative to intellectual property. The need to focus on modern licensing issues among US
companies, especially from a long term strategic point of view, is driven by several factors:
namely, the growth of the internet, the shortened lifespan of many technologies in both consumer
and industrial global markets and the economic pressure to diffuse this country’s massive
investment in research and development by the private and public sectors. After a review of the
impact that each of these factors has had on recent licensing activities it is concluded that the
future of technology licensing will be driven largely by a firm’s long term strategy for technology
management and not by any short term solution for filling a technology need. It is anticipated that
future research will validate the view that a strategic factor rather than an operational factor such
as revenue generation will form the basis for technology licensing by US firms.
2. LICENSING OF TECHNOLOGY – A MEANS FOR RECIPROCAL BENEFIT
In the licensing of technology a firm grants to another the right to use proprietary knowledge
developed by the first firm. This knowledge may take the form of an intangible asset such as a
process in manufacturing or a tangible asset such as material or a device. The knowledge may or
may not be patented or even documented. The first firm views the license as a means for
generating revenue from an asset and its value is dictated by three major factors – level of
uniqueness, ease of incorporation into products or commercializability, and time. It is then the
task of the source company to negotiate the best price for the technology assuming it has
developed a strategy for how transferring it will not hurt its own business. Of course, some
companies actually incorporate licensing technology as part of their corporate strategies and rely
on licensing as an important means of generating revenue. Excellent examples of such
companies are Qualcom and InterDigital Communications with licensing revenue of wireless
patents constituting a significant portion of their revenue and profits.
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The licensee firm, on the other hand, sees the license as a means of acquiring knowledge which
allows it to exploit a market opportunity. Hence, the act of licensing is documented in a binding
agreement or contract between the firms and as such frames the reciprocal benefit of the act to
both parties and protection each party desires from the relationship. Many authors have
described typical negotiation items in the technology licensing process, (Byrnes,1994)
(Contractor, 1981, 1984), (McCaffrey & Meyer, 1989), (White, 1990). (Business International
Corp, 1988 and 1990)
3. LICENSING OF TECHNOLOGY ON A GLOBAL SCALE
Although licensing of technology has diminished in intensity recently (Vonotras, 2003) it remains
an important business development activity from the perspective of the acquiring firm (target) or
the licensing firm (source). In fact, authors have attributed the emergence of Japan as a global
economic power to the ability of that country’s enterprises to successfully license technology
globally but primarily from US firms through the process called “technology scanning.”. (Herbig,
1995) (Odagiri, 2003) Additionally, the recent economic growth in China and India has been
linked to the investment made by those countries in attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), at
times manifested by licensing agreements, and supporting technology education for its youth.
(Story, 2003) (Zongshun, 1987) Although technology licensing agreements between firms have
been studied in the international sector (Telesio, 1979)(Contractor, 1984 among many others) a
typology of such international agreements is difficult to formulate since each country involved is
different in business culture, intellectual property (IP) legal protection and level of technological
development. The problem of unreliable trademark and copyright protection, prevalent in China
and India, (Hood, 2005), has probably reached critical proportions today in light of significant
market growth in those countries for advanced technology-based products. Additionally, China
and India as well as other developing Asian economies have designated technology acquisition
as a means for economic development. This national strategy of several Asian economies entails
governmental support for (a) financing the construction of modern factories; (b) FDI by multinational companies for entering the Asian markets; (c) science, math and engineering education
for youth.(Yoshida, 2004).
4. CORPORATE STRATEGY AND MOTIVATION FOR TECHNOLOGY LICENSING
The company interested in licensing or purchasing certain rights to the technology or “target”
company is faced with the task of determining the value of desired technology to its corporate
strategy. Some authors (Gallini & Wright, 1990) have attributed asymmetric levels of knowledge
about the technology between the firms. While this may be true in some cases, the driving force
behind the potential licensee’s interest in the technology stems from the strategic value that the
target firm places on the technology. This value need not be limited by potential profits as
suggested (Contractor, 1981) (White, 1998) but can be a necessary expense to maintain a
strategic market for other products. This paper examines the factors that contribute to that
strategic value and essentially form the important structural components of a technology licensing
agreement. Most importantly, a factor that is often neglected in prior studies of inter-firm licensing
of technology is the long term plan for assimilating or accessing the specific technology of interest
by the licensee. Clearly this factor is crucial to a firm’s long term strategic plan of revenue growth
and profitability. Notably this factor can play a pivotal role in contract negotiations and
overshadow other motivations for entering into a licensing agreement. Although the target firm
can attempt to protect itself from sudden inaccessibility to the licensed technology by an escrow
account, the only controllable alternative to such a serious event is to have a plan for autonomy
or self-reliance. Contractual issues such as compensation, exclusivity or conditions of usage in
the licensing of technology have been the study, both theoretical and empirical, of several authors
(Bessy, Brousseau and Saussier, 2000), (Cho, 1988), (Aulakh, Cavusgil and Sarkar, 1998),
(Sattin) and (Anand & Khanna, 2000). Attempts to classify these issues or rank order their
importance can be misplaced easily if the licensing firm is driven by a strategic set of issues
rather than a set of “operational” issues such as compensation and licensor support. Other
operational issues affecting the desire to license include unavailable engineering resources to
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develop the technology, desired speed to market, protection of market share or retention of
certain customers, patent protection of the technology by the source company and market
pressures by global competitors.
5. MODERN PERILS TO LICENSING TECHNOLOGY AND COUNTERMEASURES
Licensing of trade secrets and processes have always had the difficulty of proof of infringement
since, in the first case, patents are not involved. Trade secrets are becoming almost impossible to
secure despite employment agreements and since US based employees are now more mobile
and less loyal to the employer than in the past. Processes, whether patented or not, have a
problem of detection and verification in the offending firm. Another modern peril to trade secrets
and processes is that they can now be posted on the web and disseminated widely by disgruntled
employees or other firm detractors.
The music and video industries in the US have reacted to the threat the internet poses by
litigating against file sharing facilitators such as Napster and subsequent imitators. Despite court
actions favorable to copyright owners, consumer music and video sales continue to suffer due to
widespread IP theft.
Firms have become wary of modern methods for stealing intellectual property and as
countermeasures have embedded trade secrets, designs or software into devices that are “hardcoded” in chips through semiconductor masks, binary coded processors or software code with
“keys” that can turn device features on or off. In this form of technology licensing, the target firm
simply purchases the tangible unit from the source company along the lines of a “purchase and
sale” device contract with terms outlining anticipated device purchases over time and availability.
This form of technology licensing still suffers from the same single-sourced “cutoff” danger for the
licensee firm that would affect its product supply and subsequent customer dissatisfaction. Again,
the licensee firm has the incentive to develop a plan to remove itself from this danger. For the
source company this form of licensing technology, although simple in nature, is not necessarily
theft-proof since there are powerful modern tools for developing equivalent semi-conductor
designs and dis-assembling binary code.
Another modern peril facing both source and target licensing firms is the shortened life of
technology in general. The licensor firm must decide whether the investment necessary to protect
the current version of the licensable technology will pay off during the marketable period. The firm
must add the protection costs to the other overhead costs that include service support,
documentation and inventory. For a short lifetime of the technology, the business case for
licensing out may not be convincing to execute. Similarly, the target firm may find that the license
may not lead to quick revenue generation given there may be start-up costs and lost market
opportunity due to commercialization delays.
There is a duality of risk between the source and target companies with respect to both theft of
intellectual property and a shortened technology lifespan. Both parties are subject to unfulfilled
expectations of revenue generation and market opportunity.
The growth of technology markets in China and India and other Asian countries at a time when IP
protection is difficult to enforce in those markets penalizes the technology providers in the US
whether their products are being intentionally marketed in those countries or not. Hence, licensing
of technology to either a domestic firm or an international firm carries the same risk of theft. The
threat of IP theft forces the source company to adopt the attitude that IP will be stolen sooner or
later and so it must continue to invest in IP protected product designs. The source company must
then make theft difficult and expensive for the would-be thief. This is the basis for a long term
strategy of technology management for the source company – intrinsic IP protection in its
products.
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Similarly, the motivation for the target company in a licensing deal includes not only protection for
continued access to the technology but protection from theft by a competitor who has not
bothered to license the technology – a free rider. The only recourse that allows control of its
destiny for the target company is to plan a long term strategy to free itself from any dependency
of the source company’s technology. This may involve seeking an in-house solution or outright
purchase of the technology and the addition of its own IP protection. In either case, this long term
strategy for technology management of the target firm would dominate any set of contractual
terms reached with a source company.
6. CONCLUSIONS
From the perspective described in the last section, the contractual terms of a licensing agreement
between source and target firms as outlined in Table 1 of the Appendix do not necessarily change
in structure but they must now be viewed with a long term technology management strategy in
mind for either firm. Sections 2, 4 and 5 do become increasingly important for the target firm for
protection as it finds a way to obviate the need for the technology. Sections 1, 3, 6, 8 are perhaps
of more importance to the source firm that focuses on realizing revenue from its asset while
Sections 7, 9 and 10 have points of interest to both source and target firms.

Appendix A: Contract Structure & Terms
In the end the negotiations between the two entities, if successful, result in a document – for
simplicity hereinafter referred to as a licensing contract. Although Table 1 lists 10 major sections
of such a contract, it is by no means an exhaustive list, since the objective here is to discuss the
motivating factors of each party in reaching an accord for transferring the technology in light of
the target company’s strategic interest in the technology. A discussion of each factor follows the
table.
No.
1

Section
Description of
technology

Source Company
Commits to only certain aspects
of technology

2

Escrow Arrangement

Resists escrow, realizing it is
the “crown jewels”

3

Usage of technology in
Place and Time

4

Liability & Epidemic

Limits usage to assure itself of
protecting its own markets and
customers. Discusses
conditions for transferability,
assignability
Minimizes liability to itself

5

Support Issues

Minimizes support expenses
but realizes it is necessary

6

Marketing, Trademarks
and Disclosures

Limits usage of names and
trademarks normally; disallows
disclosure of terms of
agreement.
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Target Company
Wants to assure that
“complete” technology is to
be transferred
Strongly desires protection
of technology not under its
control, despite license
Wishes to define usage to
maximize potential
profitability or strategic
usage
Desires protection from
infringement lawsuits and
assurance that technology
“works”
Realizes that technology
cannot be fully
documented and some still
resides in someone’s head
at source company
Unless there is great value
in brand equity, target
company will opt for its
own trademarks and
names.
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7

Ownership & Rights to
Enhancement

Sometimes prohibits
enhancements but normally
permits them but desires rights
to “back” license enhancements

8

Payment terms

Source company wants to
make money on transaction
after covering anticipated
expenses and warranty costs

9

Contract Renewal

10

Non-Performance &
Termination

Source company wants to
assure itself of maximizing
revenue potential
Source company wants to
terminate if potential not
realized

Typically, target company
formulates enhancements
for its own markets and
applications and desires to
“own” outright such
enhancements
Target company does not
want to buy a “pig in a
poke” so is cautious about
payments, especially if
cash up front is required
Target company wants to
continue relationship if
satisfactory
Target company wants to
terminate if technology or
support is unsatisfactory

Table 1
Factors in Negotiating a Technology Transfer Contract
LEGEND TO TABLE 1
1. Description of Technology
In this section of the contract, a full description of the technology is given, citing user
manuals, product specifications, user or operator manuals, design documents, drawings,
schematics, formulae, component and module specifications, sources for such
components and modules, sublicenses for use of custom components or modules
production processes, prototypes or demo, module test and system test processes,
equipment for test, software source code, compilers, assemblers, loaders, debuggers or
other software tools, sublicenses for usage of software modules from other suppliers, and
software documentation. All documentation will need to have version numbers so that
updates, or upgrades, or software bug fixes can be incorporated into newer version
numbers. The objective of this contract section is to have the most up-to-date versions of
all documentation. This will eliminate errors in manufacturing or in being able to recreate
the technology in as bug-free a version as possible.
2. Escrow Arrangement
This section specifies what happens when the source company goes out of business, is
purchased by another entity or is merged with another entity. The protection sought here
is that all unreleased or unlicensed technology documentation is put into an “escrow
account” held by a third party (like a bank) and is released to the target company under
certain conditions (like bankruptcy of source company) so that the target company’s
usage of the technology is not disrupted by an event not under its control. The idea here
is that a revenue stream, customers of the target company will come to depend on some
aspect of the technology that is still held by the source company and not released to the
target company. An example of this dependency is a custom chip that is sold to the target
company by the source company to be incorporated in the product manufacture. The
design (mask and other specifications) of the custom chip is retained by the source
company and not revealed to the target company except through this escrow
arrangement.
3. Usage of Technology
Technology transfer contracts typically state the conditions under which the technology
can be used by the target company. For example, the technology can only be
incorporated into products sold in a country, a territory or region (spatial condition).
Similarly, the source company can prohibit the target company from selling to a certain
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set of customers with a list specified or from selling to a certain profile of customers
(customer prohibition). Another condition may be application specific, such as
incorporating the technology into medical devices but not products used in leisure and
entertainment.(application condition). Yet another condition may be time dependent. The
target company can use the technology for one or more years and then the contract has
to be renegotiated (temporal condition, sometimes called a “sunset” clause). A common
restriction in tech transfer contracts is that the technology cannot be sublicensed (or
assigned) by the target company except to a wholly owned subsidiary. This sublicensing
restriction can only be lifted by the source company and re-negotiations are usually
implied to do so.
4. Liability & Epidemic Scenario
An important clause in a tech transfer agreement is that dealing with liability. The target
company usually wants assurance that the source company “owns” the technology and is
willing to assume liability for any infringement legal action brought against the target
company by a third party. Such protection by the source company exempts it from legal
action brought against the target company for misrepresentation of product or other
misuse, abuse or business actions not directly tied to the integrity of the technology being
licensed or transferred. Should a problem occur with products manufactured utilizing the
technology and if the source of the problem is linked directly to the technology under
license, then the source company is liable for expenses incurred by the target company if
the problem becomes one of “epidemic” proportions – usually 10% or more of all
products shipped having the “problem.”
5. Support Issues
Rarely can a technology be transferred or licensed without substantial support from the
source company. This support can take many forms. First, the form of documentation
turned over by the source company may be seen as “non-standard” by the target
company so its designers or manufacturing engineers may be helped in interpreting the
documentation. This can be accomplished through “training” or consultation visits or
conversations. A typical contract acknowledges the possible need for such support and
limits the time allocated by the source company for such support in order to prevent
abuse by the target company of valuable engineering or production time. Further, if
problems occur in incorporating the technology, especially in the case that a “bug” or
defect is discovered by the target company, the source company usually specifies a
“response” time to fix the bug or at least assign an engineer to work on it with the target
company.
6. Marketing, Trademarks and Disclosures
Restrictions from the source company may prevent the target company from even
disclosing that it has entered into a licensing agreement or that it is using IP from the
source company. The source company may see such protection as necessary to prevent
dilution of a trademark value or prevention of undesirable usage of it by the target
company. In some cases, the source company may find it advantageous to encourage
the target company to advertise this fact. For example, the “Intel Inside” trademark
campaign is seen as an advantage to both source and target firms.
7. Ownership and Rights of Enhancements
Typically the source company retains all ownership rights of the technology with the
target company receiving unlimited rights (except for conditions cited above) to use the
technology. However, it is common for the target company to examine and understand
the technology and then make “enhancements” in hardware, software or system design.
This section of the contract specifies the ownership of such enhancements (usually the
target company if developed unilaterally) but allows the source company to cross-license
the usage of such enhancements under certain conditions. An example of such condition
is forgiveness of licensing fees due to the source company if the source company
decides to use the enhancements in its products or associated manufacturing processes.
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8. Payment Terms & Valuation
The target company usually has a dollar figure in mind of what its usage of the
technology is worth. Normally, the value is determined by what it would cost to develop
the technology itself in direct expenses but also working in the market lost during the time
it would take to develop it. The latter can also be important strategically to the target
company, more so perhaps than any revenue or profit component lost in time. The
source company, of course, is in a strong negotiating position if it is the only one or one
of very few sources of the technology. The position is made stronger if its technology has
become a “standard” in the industry. An example of this is the use of Rockwell
International modem chip sets or modules for the fax machine boom of the 1980’s and
1990’s. Many fax machine makers licensed or simply bought the chips from Rockwell
because its chips were standards compliant, small in size and readily available in volume.
Licensing fees for the technology were incorporated into the price per chip set. Payment
terms can take the form determined by three major factors. First, if any modification
needs to be made to the technology by the source company, then a “non-recurring”
engineering charge applies. This charge can be expensive since it necessitates valuable
engineering design and test time at the source company. Thus, the source company will
not charge time and materials expense but also “opportunity lost” value of the
engineering team, reflecting the potential value of other product design that the
engineering team could have otherwise been assigned to do. A second factor for
payment is exclusivity. Should the target company wants to exclude any other company,
besides the source company, from using the technology, the price of licensing the
technology goes up substantially. The source company is essentially giving up its right to
license the technology to the rest of the world for the “lifetime” of the technology. Hence,
it is forced to estimate what the potential or future licensing fees may be for the
technology from everyone else. Normally, the source company comes up with an
estimate that is exorbitantly high, thus challenging the target company to validate that
such a high price is warranted. The third factor influencing payment terms is that of
deciding whether a “pay as you go” scheme is better than a one-time payment. Should
the volume of usage is projected to be high, then a one-time payment is preferable to the
target company. However, if there is uncertainty to the volume or to the usability or
integrity of the technology, then a pay as you go scenario is preferable. An example of a
pay as you go set of terms is simply buying individual chips or modules (either software
or hardware) from the source company, with specified delivery dates and volumes. The
source company may see a pay as you go scheme as not worth its time, especially with
the support it is committed to perform. Hence, a common element demanded by the
source company in a pay as you scheme is a “down payment” to cover its one time
expenses and minimal profit in actually performing the transfer. Such a payment may
also cover the first N months of usage or the first N modules used by the target company.
9. Contract Renewal
It is rarely the case that the licensing agreement is made “evergreen” or without a specific
termination or renewal date. Such a date forces both parties to review the merits of the
original agreement and revise the terms to reflect current requirements from both sides.
10. Non-Performance & Termination
This section protects both parties in cases of breach, bankruptcy, sale of company or
change of control especially if such change involves a known competitor to either party.

International Journal of Business Research
Vol 2, No. 1, 2005, ISSN 554-5466

151

Bibliography
Anand, B.N., Khanna T., “Intellectual Property Rights and Contract Structure,” Journal of
Industrial Economics, 48, 2000, 103-135.
Aulakh, P.S., Cavusgil, S.T., and Sarkar, M.B.,. “Compensation in International Licensing
Agreements,” Journal of International Businss Studies, 29, 1998, 409-419.
Bessy, Christian, Brousseau, Eric and Saussier, Stephane, “Institutional Environment and Cost
of Transacting Intangibles: The Case of Technology Licensing Agreements.” CEE and ATOM,
2000, University of Paris.
Byrnes, N., Licensing Technology: Drafting and Negotiating Agreements. Stockton, New York,
1994.
Business International Corp., International Licensing Management, Bus. Int’l Corp, New York,
1988.
Business International Corp., Building a Licensing Strategy for World Markets, Bus. Int’l Corp,
New York, 1990.
Cho, Kang R., “Issues of Compensation in International Technology Licensing,” Management
International Review, 28, 1988, 70-79.
Contractor, F., International Technology Licensing: Compensation, Costs and Negotiation,
Lexington Books, Lexington, MA, 1981.
Contractor, F., Licensing in International Strategy: A Guide for Negotiations and Planning,
Quorum Books, Westport, CN, 1985.
Gallini, N.T. & Wright, B., “Technology Transfer Under Asymmetric Information,” Rand Journal of
Economics, 21, 1990, 147-160.
Herbig, Paul, Innovation, Japanese Style. Quorum Books, Westport, CN, 1995.
Hood, Marlowe, “Steal this Software,” IEEE Spectrum. June 2005, 52-53.
Odagiri, Hiroyuki, “The Japanese System for Creation and Diffusion of Technological
Knowledge,” Chapter 7 in Hemmert, M and Oberlander, C., Technology and Innovation in Japan:
Policy and Management for the 21st Century. New York: Routledge, New York, 2003, 115-128.
McCaffrey, Roger A. & Meyer, Thomas A., An Executive’s Guide to Licensing, Dow-Jones-Irwin,
Homewood, IL, 1989..
Sattin, Jean-Francois, “Institutional Framework, Contractual Design, and Survival of Technology
Licensing Agreements,” ATOM, 2000, University of Paris.
Story, Jonathan, China: the Race to Market, Prentice Hall, London, 2003.
Telesio, Piero, Technology Licensing and Multi-National Enterprises, Praeger Publishers, New
York, 1979.
Vengelers, R., “Internal R&D Expenditures and External Technology Sourcing,” Research Policy
26, 1997, 303-315.
Vonortas, Nichoas, “Technology Licensing,” Report at Center for International Science and
Technology Policy, George Washington University, October 10, 2003.
White, Edward P., Licensing – A Strategy for Profits, KEW Licensing Press, Chapel Hill, NC,
1990.
Yoshida, Phyllis G., “Asian Economies Striving to Enhance Innovation Capabilities,” Research
Technology Management, 44 (1), 2001, 2-6.
Zongshun, Tang, “Transfer of Patented Technology to China,”. Chapter Six in Robinson, Richard
(ed).. Foreign Capital and Technology in China, 1987.

International Journal of Business Research
Vol 2, No. 1, 2005, ISSN 554-5466

152

